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Abstract 
 
Using firm level data during 1985-2005, we measured the TFP of Korean manufacturing 
sector and identified determinants of the TFP growth rate. Given that various institutions for fair 
competition were introduced in 1988, investigating the difference of the TFP trends before and 
after the Asian financial crisis is meaningful. With the massive unbalanced panel data, we 
examined quantitatively whether or not the comprehensive structural reforms have the effect on 
the Korean economy in terms of productivity.  
The data used in this research are financial statements obtained from KIS (Korea 
Information Service). These cover statutory audit firms and registered firms as well as listed 
firms in KOSPI and KOSDAQ from 1985 to 2005. Given that statutory audit firms and 
registration firms are smaller and less competent than listed firms in KOSPI and KOSDAQ and 
their proportion in the sample amounts to 74.5%, the data used in this paper is expected to 
lessen the sample bias than previous literatures which only focused on listed firms. When the 
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coverage of the data used here is compared with the Business Survey by National Statistical 
Office which covers the whole firms with fifty or more employees, the data used here account 
for more than 70% of employees, sales and tangible asset, thus the data used in this research has 
the representativeness to some extent.  
It is shown that the TFP growth rate in the period 1985-1992 is negligible, 0.5% per annum, 
thus the TFP is not the main source of economy growth during this period. However, after steep 
decline in 1998, the TFP bounced back rapidly with 3.1% growth rate per annum in the period 
1999-2005, which implies that the paradigm of economy growth has changes inputs-driven into 
TFP driven growth. When the TFP growth is decomposed, it is revealed that the output 
reallocation effect as well as within effect are main sources of the TFP growth. With regard to 
the determinants of the TFP growth rate, the reinforcement of competition after the Asian 
financial crisis contributed to the TFP growth rate, justifying introduction of various institutions 
for fair competition during the crisis. When industries are classified into sub industries by 
technology intensity, it can be said that the TFP growth has been driven by high technology and 
medium-high technology, and in high technology industry, the reinforcement of competition 
during post-crisis period and R&D intensity affected the TFP growth rate positively and 
significantly.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper investigates the impact of the dramatic structural reforms initiated from 1998 for 
the purpose of the reinforcement of fair competition in terms of the productivity. Over the past 
three decades East Asia countries has achieved remarkable economic growth with the almost 
eight percent of real GDP growth per annum before the Asian financial crisis. It has been argued 
in the literature that the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) explains one-third of East Asia’s rapid 
growth which is large relative to other economies, both absolutely and as a share of output 
growth (World bank, 1993), and Korea’s successful economic development before the Asian 
financial crisis has resulted from government-led industrial policy and strategic trade policy 
(Chang, 1994). However, Krugman (1994), Young (1995) and Rodrik (1995) raised critical view 
on the economic growth of Asian countries that the rapid growth of Asian countries was 
attributed to excessive usage of production input factors, not to the enhancement of productivity. 
As the Asian financial crisis which originated from the sudden depreciation of the Baht in 
Thailand swept over the East Asian countries in the end of 1977, the debates on East Asia’s 
economy growth including Korea became fiercer. 
The presence of economic crisis allowed radical structural reforms based on consensus that 
new reforms are essential for recovery from the economic crisis and sustainable growth of 
Korean economy. As the IMF’s bailout program began in December of 1997, the IMF asked the 
Korean government to undertake a series of actions to improve market environment for fair 
competition cutting off the unreasonable backward management practice from the past. In detail, 
the financial reform was implemented to restructure the entire financial sector and to improve 
the efficiency of the operations of financial institutions. As labor market reform, government 
legalized the usage of temporary agency workers and dismissal of workers through a simple 
procedure to reduce labor cost and to improve the flexibility of labor market. Regarding 
corporate sector reform, due to the newly introduced institutions for fair competition, which are 
mentioned in detail in Section 2, the firms could not rely on the privilege from government as 
well as could not derive benefits by illegal trade within business group any longer. In addition, 
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restrictions on inflows of FDI were abandoned.  
In this study, by using firm level data before and after the Asian financial crisis, we examine 
how structural reforms in post-crisis Korea affected TFP growth and the efficiency of resource 
reallocation. To the best of our knowledge, there are almost no quantitative studies on whether 
the comprehensive structural reforms occurred in Korea have contributed to productivity growth. 
Compared with the country or industry level, the measurement of TFP at the firm level can 
consider the heterogeneity among firms and offer rich information on firms’ behavior. Moreover, 
we investigate whether the reinforcement of fair competition contributed to post-crisis TFP 
growth or not. 
We found that aggregate TFP growth is higher after the structural reforms than before. The 
TFP growth until 1992 is negligible, the 0.5% growth rate per annum, which implies at least the 
TFP growth is not the main engine of economic growth and supports the arguments of Krugman 
(1994), Young (1994, 1995) and Rodrik (1995). However, after the Asian financial crisis, we 
observed the TFP bounced back rapidly with the 3.1% growth rate per annum, which means that 
the TFP growth has contributed to rapid Korean economic recovery. We also found that the 
competition has a significant effect on the TFP growth in the post-crisis period. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After brief consideration on the change 
of competition environment after the financial crisis in section 2, section 3 reviews previous 
literature. Section 4 explains data and TFP measurement used in analysis. Section 5 presents the 
sources of aggregate productivity growth and section 6 shows the effect of competition with 
structural reform on the TFP growth. Finally section 7 summarizes our findings and offers 
policy implication.  
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2. The change of competition environments after the financial crisis 
 
In the past, under the government-driven development policies, government offered various 
benefits in resource distribution to a few “chaebols” that are highly diversified, 
family-controlled conglomerates. Korean governments set the next technology target on the 
basis of the opinion of business leader, then helped selected firms enter and prosper in targeted 
industries though credit allocation at below market interest rates, research and development 
assistance, and temporary protection from domestic and foreign competition. The government 
tightly regulated and coordinated the investment plans of chaebols to assure that investment was 
of the proper magnitude as well as allocated efficiently (Crotty and Lee, 2001). Moreover, in 
order to regulate the investment of chaebols, the government controlled both the domestic 
banking system and cross border capital (Cho and Kim, 1994).  
The IMF asked the Korean government to undertake a series of action to improve the poor 
governance and low transparency in Korean firms, in return for the financial rescue packaging 
(Chang et al., 2007). In this vein, Korean government introduced various institutions to improve 
managerial transparency and financial soundness, and forced chaebols to concentrate on core 
competencies.  
In order to improve managerial transparency, combined financial statement became 
obligatory to the biggest 30 business group (Feb. 1998), the financial accounting standards were 
revised to be in line with international accounting standards (Dec. 1999), and the government 
forced the listed firms to assign outside directors totaling as many as over a fourth of their board 
member (Feb. 1998). These institutions prevented firms from obtaining improper benefits via 
releasing wrong information and made managerial decision more transparent.  
Institutions for chaebols’ financial soundness also introduced simultaneously. chaebols were 
required to abolish cross-debt guarantees (Apr. 1998) and the ceiling on equity investment was 
revived (Dec. 1999) to reduce improper transaction within business group. On the basis of the 
faith that growth strategy depending on excessive loan and expansion was not effective any 
longer, Korean government forced chaebols to lower debt-equity ratio under 200% by the end of 
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1999, and this resulted in disposal of business sector and asset with low profitability.  
Korean government recognized that excessive diversification of chaebols caused their 
unstable financial structure and low profitability. As a consequence, government pushed 
business exchange, so called Big Deal, for concentrating on core competencies, reducing 
excessive capacity. Big Deal was focused on capital intensive industries such as chemicals, 
semiconductor, motor vehicles and airplanes.  
With liberalization of capital market and foreign investment regimes as well as 
aforementioned institutions, the paradigm of market competition has changed from closed and 
domestic competition to open and global one since 1999. After partially opening stock market to 
foreign investors for the first time in 1992, the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) continually 
mitigated foreign investment limit and finally opened its market completely to foreign investor 
as of May, 1998 (Chang et al., 2007).  
Under the changed market environments resulting from the newly introduced institutions, 
firms could not enjoy various privileges from government any longer and they were forced to 
improve their corporate governance and transparency in line with international standards. In 
addition, as trade barrier of capital market as well as product market disappeared, firms were 
exposed fierce global competition. In this vein, this research aims to examine whether the 
environmental changes fair competition after the Asian financial crisis contributed to the 
productivity growth or not.  
 
 
3. Literature review 
 
The previous literature related to this research can be categorized into the change of Korean 
economy after the Asian financial crisis, the measurement of the TFP, and the effect of 
competition on the TFP. First, regarding the change of Korean economy after the Asian financial 
crisis, previous literature offers mixed evidence on the change after the financial crisis. As 
pessimistic views, Crotty and Lee (2002) claimed that post-crisis neoliberal restructuring which 
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moved Korea towards a globally open and capital market-based financial system, failed to 
generate sustainable economic recovery and threatens to significantly lower Korea’s long-term 
rate of capital accumulation. In the same vein, Jo (2005) offered empirical evidence that 
operating profits of Chaebol in post crisis stayed at the same level as that in pre crisis in spite of 
improvement of financial structure by reducing debt. In addition, Park (2001) and Chopra et al. 
(2001) raised criticism on the rapid recovery from the crisis arguing that that the major factors 
of Korean economic recovery are not the structural reforms, but the expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policies and a more favorable external environment characterized by depreciated 
Korean Won. On the other hand, as optimistic views, Kim and In (2004) also insisted average 
debt-equity ratio of the top 5th firms decreased from 355% in 1997 to 182% in 2001 and that of 
the top 30th firms decreased more dramatically from 545% to 188% for the same period. 
According to Chang el al. (2007), the information asymmetry of Korean firms is lower after the 
financial crisis than before, implying that corporate transparency, in effect, improve with the 
change in business environment.  
With respect to the measurement of the TFP of Korea, Aw et al. (2000, 2003), Hahn (2000, 
2004), Ahn et al. (2004), Ahn (2006), Pyo et al. (2006), Kim (2006), Kwack (2007), Jung 
(2008) and Oh et al. (2009) measured the TFP of Korean manufacturing using micro level data. 
While Jung (2008) used firm level data, others used plant level data. Previous literatures offer 
somewhat different TFP growth rates before and after the Asian financial crisis. For example, 
Ahn (2006) showed that the annual TFP growth rate is 1.7% in the period 1990-1997 and 4.9% 
in the period 1997-2003, which implies the growth rate in post crisis is higher than that in pre 
crisis. On the other hand, Kwack (2007) showed 2.2% in the period 1988-1996 and 2.1% in the 
period 2000-2004 implying that there is not significant TFP increase after the crisis.  
In the relation of market competition and TFP, Nickell (1996) estimated the production 
function including the markup percentage of the company level and the market competitive 
indices, such as the degree of concentration to analyze the market competition and productivity. 
The results presented that market competition has a positive influence on the growing rate of 
TFP at the firm level. In the sequential study, Nickell et al. (1997) showed that when a firm 
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received strong pressure from corporate governance, market competition has a weaker influence 
on the productivity of a firm, which implies market competition encourages management effort 
and improve the productivity. Besides Funakoshi et al. (2006) examined the empirical 
relationship between market competition and corporate productivity using around 2,400 
Japanese firm data. This showed that market competition increased the TFP of small firms more 
than that of large firms and enhanced the TFP of R&D intensive firms.   
   
 
4. Data and the productivity measurement 
 
4.1. Data 
 
Considering the difficulties in measuring inputs and outputs of service sectors and the 
heterogeneity among service sectors, we confine this analysis to manufacturing sectors. The 
data used in this research are financial statements obtained from KIS (Korea Information 
Service). These cover statutory audit firms and registered firms as well as listed firms in KOSPI 
and KOSDAQ from 1985 to 20051. Given that statutory audit firms and registration firms are 
smaller and less competent than listed firms in KOSPI and KOSDAQ and their proportion in the 
sample amounts to 74.5%, the data used in this paper is expected to lessen the sample bias than 
previous literatures which only focused on listed firms2. When the coverage of the data used 
here is compared with the Business Survey by National Statistical Office which covers the 
whole firms with fifty or more employees, the data used here account for more than 70% of 
employees, sales and tangible asset as shown in Table 1, thus the data used in this research has 
                                                  
1 Listed firms in KOSPI consist of large and well established firms and listed firms in KOSDAQ are 
relatively young firms with high technology. Statutory audit firms are the firms whose total asset is 
more than 7 billion Korean Won so that external audit is mandatory by laws. Registered firms are firms 
which are registered in Financial Supervisory Service to transact securities.   
2 As mentioned Section 3, Jung (2008) is the only previous literature which used firm level data. 
However, Jung (2008) covered only listed firm in KOSPI and KOSDAQ, excluding statutory audit 
firms and registration firms, thus his result has the possibility to overestimate the TFP of manufacturing 
via aggregation. 
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the representativeness to some extent.  
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
The standard of ICPA (International Comparison of Productivity among Asian Countries) is 
adopted for industry classification. According to ICPA standards, the total industry can be 
classified into 33 sub industries and the 6th to 25th sub industries among them are classified as 
manufacturing sector. As shown in Table 2, the total number of observations is 59,002 and 
electrical machinery, non-electrical machinery, chemicals and motor vehicles sectors hold 
17.2%, 12.1%, 10.7% and 10.1%, respectively.  
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
The price indexes for output and inputs and depreciation rate are calculated from EU 
KLEMS Growth and Productivity Account. The information on Korea in EU KLEMS data is 
based on the National Account from the Bank of Korea and several labor statistics from 
National Statistical Office and Ministry of Labor. By using the nominal and real value of inputs 
and output as well as depreciation and labor hour in EU KLEMS data, price indexes, 
depreciation rate and average labor hour are derived.  
 
 
4.2.The measurement of TFP 
 
Following Good, Nadiri and Sickles (1996) and subsequent empirical studies including Kim 
(2007) and Fukao et al. (2006), firm level TFP was estimated by the chained-multilateral index 
number approach. It is derived from translog production function with satisfying four desirable 
properties: transitivity for cross sectional and time series comparison, superlativity for second 
order local approximation, allowance for technological change over time and no assumption on 
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perfect competition. TFP level for firm f in year t in a certain industry is defined in comparison 
with the TFP level of a hypothetical representative firm in the base year in that industry as 
follows:   
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where Qf, t, Si, f, t, and Xi, f, t denote the gross output of firm f in year t, the cost share of factor i 
for firm f in year t, and firm f’s input of factor i in year t, respectively. Variables with an upper 
bar denote the industry average of that variable. The representative firms for each industry are 
defined as a hypothetical firm whose output, inputs, and cost shares of all production factors are 
identical with the industry average.  
The first two terms on the right hand side of equation (1) denote the gap between firm f’s 
TFP level in year t and the representative firm’s TFP level in that year. The third and fourth 
term denote the gap between the representative firm’s TFP level in year t and the representative 
firm’s TFP level in base year t0. Therefore, lnTFPf, t in equation (1) denotes the gap between 
firm f’s TFP level in year t and the representative firm’s TFP level in the base year. As in the 
previous literature, constant returns to scale is assumed on the production function whose input 
factors are capital input, labor input and real intermediate input.  
In calculating equation (1), base year t0 is set to be 2000. As usual with micro-level data, it 
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is often pointed out that since some observation may have extraordinary values in their inputs or 
output, values of inputs and output of representative firm may be affected. For this reason, we 
take two-step calculation method. As the first step, the multilateral TFP is calculated in a normal 
way. Then, the outliers are screened out by excluding the observation whose TFP index deviates 
from the industry average of TFP in the year farther than three times standard deviation. As the 
second step, multilateral TFP is calculated again with recalculated industry average value. See 
the Appendix for more detailed description on variables.  
The result of aggregate TFP measurement is shown in Table 3 and Figure 1. The aggregate 
TFP of Korean manufacturing has increased 29.5% in the period 1985-2005 with annual growth 
rate of 1.3%. The decline in 1998 due to the Asian financial crisis is remarkable. In 1998 the 
TFP decreased to the level of 1985, but next year it quickly recovered to the level of 1997. 
Remarkable result is that aggregate TFP growth rate is higher after the structural reforms than 
before. The TFP growth in the period 1985-1992 is negligible, the 0.5% growth rate per annum, 
which implies at least the TFP growth is not the main engine of economic growth and is 
consistent to the arguments of Krugman (1994), Young (1994, 1995) and Rodrik (1995). After 
small increase of annul growth rate of aggregate TFP, 1.6% in the period 1993-1997, the TFP 
bounced back rapidly with the 3.1% growth rate per annum in the period 1999-2005, which 
means that TFP growth has contributed to rapid Korean economic recovery and the paradigm of 
economy growth has changed from inputs-driven into TFP-driven growth. Another remarkable 
result is that the increasing gap between weighted and unweighted mean implies the movement 
of market share toward more productive firms.  
 
[Table 3 here] 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
In addition, on the basis of methodological work at the OECD, manufacturing industries 
were classified into four different categories of technological intensity; high, medium-high, 
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medium-low and low technology industry.3 As shown in Figure 2, aggregate TFP growth of 
manufacturing was driven mainly by high and medium-high technology industries while 
aggregate TFP of low and medium-low technology industries have been hardly improved over 
time.  
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
The weighted means of lnTFP for major industries are presented in Figure 3. Electrical 
machinery industry marked the highest increase of TFP, 44.8%, and then instruments industry 
ranked the second highest increase, 42.7%. The TFP of motor vehicles industry during the 
financial crisis declined most seriously to the level of 1985 although all the industries 
experienced commonly the TFP decline during this period. This is partly due to the sensitivity 
of motor vehicles to the business cycle and domestic market demand. In the case of primary 
metal industry, it shows U-shaped curve distinctively because POSCO, the largest steal 
company in Korea, constructed new work phase in Gwangyang to expand its production 
capacities twice from 1987 to 1992, which seems to have caused the decline of productivity.  
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
 
5. The sources of aggregate productivity growth 
 
In order to identify the source of aggregate productivity growth, we decompose aggregate 
TFP using cross-sectional decomposition methodology utilized by Olley and Pakes (1996) and 
Griliches and Regev (1995). To begin with, an aggregate productivity in a given industry can be 
represented by a weighted average of each individual firm’ productivity as follows;  
                                                  
3 Refer to the research of Schaaper (2004) for more detailed standard of categorization.  
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, ,ln lnt f t f tf FTFP TFPθ∈=∑                                    (2) 
 
where θf, t denotes firm f’s gross output share in year t in that industry. F is the set of all the 
firms existed in year t in the industry. Then, as Olley and Pakes (1996) showed, we can 
decompose the manufacturing sector’s TFP in year t into the following two factors.  
 
, ,ln ln ( )(ln ln )t t f t t f t tfTFP TFP TFP TFPθ θ= + − −∑                (3) 
 
where an upper bar over a variable represents the cross-sectional unweighted mean across 
all firms in the same industry. Therefore an aggregate productivity can be decomposed into two 
parts: The unweighted aggregated productivity and the total covariance between firm’s share of 
industry output and its productivity. In this decomposition, covariance term reflects gains in 
productivity resulting from high productive firms’ expanding output shares or from low 
productive firms’ shrinking output shares, that is output reallocation effect.  
The decomposition results for major industries are presented in Table 4. In most industries, 
the covariance terms have positive sign which means output reallocation effect contributed to 
the aggregate productivity. Especially, major industries in Korea such as electrical machinery 
and motor vehicles have positive sign of covariance term over the whole period and their 
proportions to the aggregate productivity are relatively high.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
The Olley and Pakes decomposition indicates whether or not more productive firms are 
gaining at the expense of the less productive firms. But it does not differentiate between the 
individual contribution of resource reallocation and factors that are not related to resource 
reallocation on productivity growth. This can be captured by the Griliches and Regev 
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decomposition (Dimova, 2008).  
Griliches and Regev (1996) suggested that the change in a firm’s contribution to the total 
can be decomposed as follows:  
 
ln ln ( ) ln ( ) ln ( )t t t i t iTFP TFP a d TFP d TFP aθ θ θ θ− −− = +         (4) 
 
where ( ) ( ) / 2t t ix a x x −= +  designates the period average for a variable and 
t t idx x x −= −  its change. This decomposition is meaningful for continuing firms in that it 
makes possible to separate the contribution of within-firm productivity growth from the 
between-firm shifts in the relative weight of high – versus low-productivity firms.  
The result of Griliches and Regev decomposition is shown is Table 5 and Figure 4. Except 
apparel and transportation industries, between effects contributed to the productivity positively 
during 1999-2002, and especially in fifteen industries within effect during 1999-2002 was 
higher than during 1993-1996. In the case of major industries in Figure 3, the between effects of 
chemicals, non-electrical machinery, electrical machinery and motor vehicles were enhanced 
after the financial crisis. Similarly, the within effects of primary metal, non-electrical machinery, 
electrical machinery and motor vehicles were also improved after the financial crisis.  
 
[Table 5 here] 
[Figure 4 here]  
 
In order to identify output reallocation effect more intuitively, firms are divided into four 
quartiles from the lowest quartile (Q1) to the highest quartile (Q4) according to the productivity 
level by year and industry as shown in Figure 5. It is remarkable that the output share of the top 
50% (Q3+Q4) tends to increase over time and exceeds 70% except chemical industry since 
1993. In the case of chemical industry, the output share of the top 50% is not high around 40% 
compared with other industries, but since 1999 it began to increase rapidly to around 70%. This 
trend of chemical industry is closely related to the trend of lnTFP in Figure 3 in that the 
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productivity of chemical industry was stagnant until 1999, then, it increased rapidly.  
 
[Figure 5 here]  
 
The results of the decompositions by equation (3) and (4) implies commonly that the output 
reallocation effect that more productive firms take up higher market share has contributed to the 
increase of the TFP and Figure 5 is the ex-post evidence for this effect. Moreover, Griliches and 
Regev decomposition provides additional information that firms’ effort to improve their 
productivity, i.e. within effect, is another source of productivity increase.   
 
 
6. Market competition and productivity growth 
 
It is revealed that within effect is one of the sources of productivity growth in section 5, and 
Korean government introduced various institutions for fair competition after the Asian financial 
crisis. In this vein, this section investigates whether or not the change of competition 
environment after the Asian financial crisis contributed to firm’s productivity growth. Thus, as a 
measure of market competition at the industry level, the index Aghion et al.(2002) suggested is 
used as follows: 
 
11jt itc lN
= − ∑
   
                                    (5) 
 
where i indexes firms,  j indexes industry, t indexes time, Njt is the number of firms in the 
industry j in year t, and lit is defined as (operating profit – financial cost)/sales 4. A value of 1 
indicates perfect competition, i.e. price equals marginal cost while values below 1 indicate some 
                                                  
4 The financial cost is the multiplication of capital cost and capital stock. The capital cost is assumed to 
be the bond rate and the capital stock is measured using the perpetual inventory method. See the 
Appendix for detailed information on the bond rate and the perpetual inventory method. 
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degree of market power.  
To examine the effect of market competition on the productivity growth rate, pooled OLS 
model is used as follows;  
 
  dlnTFPijt = f(lnTFPijt-1, Xijt-1, cjt-1, crisisit, cjt-1*crisisit, yeart, industryj)     (6) 
 
where i indexes firms,  j indexes industry, t indexes time, dlnTFPijt is the TFP growth rate 
(=lnTFPijt - lnTFPijt-1), Xijt-1, is control variable for firm i at time t-1, cjt-1, is the competition 
index of industry j at time t-1, and crisisit is post-crisis dummy which has value 1 if year>1998, 
otherwise 0. The interaction term between competition and post-crisis dummy is expected to 
capture the effect of competition environment’ change after the financial crisis on the 
productivity growth rate, and industry and year dummy are added to control the industry 
characteristics and macro-economic effect. With regard to control variable Xijt-1, firm size 
(=log(total asset)), firm age, group dummy which has value 1 if a firm belongs to business 
group, debt ratio (=debt/total asset), no R&D dummy which has value 1 if a firm do not invest 
on R&D, R&D intensity (=R&D/sales) and export/output defined as the ratio of industry export 
to industry output.5 Descriptive statics for variables are presented in Table 6.  
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
However, the presence of unmodeled heterogeneity among firms, such as manager’s 
capability and the skill of the employees can make the coefficient from pooled OLS biased. 
Thus the fixed effect model is also used to remove systematic heterogeneity from the error term 
by adding firm specific constant term as follows.  
 
dlnTFPijt = αi + f(lnTFPijt-1, Xijt-1, cjt-1, crisisit, cjt-1*crisisit, yeart)        (7) 
                                                  
5 There is a criticism that depreciated Korean won during crisis period provided favorable environment 
for export, and this might contributed to the recovery from the crisis (Park; 2001, Chopra et al.; 2001). 
To control export effect, we added the ratio of export to output at industry level.  
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Estimation of fixed effect model sacrifices a lot of degree of freedom. And with so many 
firms and short time period, these intercepts may be picking up on a lot of random error and 
thus be quite inconsistent. Therefore, we convert variables for each observation into a deviation 
from the mean in each firm. This sweeps out the unit effect and we no longer need to include an 
intercept term.  
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
The regression results of pooled OLS and fixed effect model presented in Table 7 implies as 
follows. First, the reinforcement of market competition after the financial crisis stimulated for 
firms to increase their productivity. Although post-crisis dummy has positive and statistically 
significant value in model 1 and 3, it turns to negative (Model 2) or lessened (Model 4) when 
interaction term is added, and interaction term has positive and statistically significant value 
both in pooled OLS and fixed effect model. Although the TFP growth due to the favorable 
export environment during post-crisis period is controlled by inserting export/output ratio at the 
industry level, the interaction term of (A) and (B) has significant and positive effect on the TFP 
growth rate.  
Second, the productivity tends to converge strongly. A firm which has higher value in the 
TFP or size or age at previous year is likely to have lower TFP growth rate next year. Given that 
it is general for the TFP level and size of a firm to increase gradually as time goes on, the 
negative coefficients of lnTFP, log(total asset) and age support the convergence of productivity 
among firms. This trend becomes stronger when the heterogeneity among firms is controlled. 
Third, the firms affiliated with business groups have higher productivity. Tangible and 
intangible support within the same business group can contribute to enhance the productivity. 
This fact is consistent with many previous studies which claimed that affiliation with a business 
group improves firm performance (Carney et al. 2008, Ma et al., 2006, Khanna and Palepu, 
2000, Blanchard et al., 2004) 
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Fourth, R&D investment contributes to the TFP growth rate. The coefficient of R&D 
intensity in Pooled OLS implies that 10% increase in R&D intensity results in 1.9% increase in 
the TFP growth rate. Non-R&D performer has lower TFP growth rate than R&D performer, but 
this is not statistically significant.  
Fifth, the TFP growth rate is affected by the export environment. When the export 
proportion of certain industry to which a firm belongs increases, a firm’s TFP growth rate also 
increases. This effect may be valid during post-crisis period when Korean firms had advantage 
in trade due to the depreciated Korean won.  
The determinants of the TFP growth rate are also considered by technology intensity 
following OECD standards. Except low technology industry, the reinforcement of competition 
after the Asian financial crisis contributed to TFP growth rate significantly, and its effect is the 
largest in high technology industry. Moreover, the effect of R&D intensity on the TFP growth 
rate is positive and significant only in high technology and medium-high technology industries. 
It is also remarkable that group dummy is not significant only in high technology industry, 
which implies that the reinforcement of core competency by R&D is more important than 
tangible and intangible support within business group in high technology industry.  
 
[Table 8 here] 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
Using firm level data during 1985-2005, we measured the TFP of Korean manufacturing 
sector and identified determinants of the TFP growth rate. Given that various institutions for fair 
competition were introduced in 1988, investigating the difference of the TFP trends before and 
after the Asian financial crisis is meaningful. With the massive unbalanced panel data, we 
examined quantitatively whether or not the comprehensive structural reforms have the effect on 
the Korean economy in terms of productivity.  
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It is shown that the TFP growth rate in the period 1985-1992 is negligible, 0.5% per annum, 
thus the TFP is not the main source of economy growth during this period. However, after steep 
decline in 1998, the TFP bounced back rapidly with 3.1% growth rate per annum in the period 
1999-2005, which implies that the paradigm of economy growth has changes inputs-driven into 
TFP driven growth. When the TFP growth is decomposed, it is revealed that the output 
reallocation effect as well as within effect are main sources of the TFP growth. With regard to 
the determinants of the TFP growth rate, the reinforcement of competition after the Asian 
financial crisis contributed to the TFP growth rate, justifying introduction of various institutions 
for fair competition during the crisis. When industries are classified into sub industries by 
technology intensity, it can be said that the TFP growth has been driven by high technology and 
medium-high technology, and in high technology industry, the reinforcement of competition 
during post-crisis period and R&D intensity affected the TFP growth rate positively and 
significantly.  
However, this study raises many issues as future research. First, the dynamic characteristics 
of firms such as entry and exit should be considered. By using the information on entry and exit, 
the more detailed sources of the TFP growth can be provided. Second, the usage of more 
accurate competition index is required. Competition index used in this study assumes that the 
degree of competition is in the relation of reciprocal proportion with average mark-up. However, 
the degree of competition which firms face can be affected by market structure, import 
penetration, regulation etc. More accurate competition index is expected to improve the 
reliability of the research.  
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Appendix. Main variables to measure TFP6  
 
Output 
For output, gross sales after adjusting for inventory are used. Gross output is deflated by output 
deflators derived from EU KLEMS data.  
 
Capital Stock 
The perpetual inventory method is used to calculate real capital stock. 
 
1(1 ) tt t
t
NOMIK K
PK
δ −= − +                                    (A.1) 
1t t tNOMI KNB KNB DEP−= − +                              (A.2) 
 
where PKt is the price index for the capital asset, KNBt is the book value of tangible fixed asst 
minus land and construction in-progress, DEPt is the accounting depreciation during the period, 
NOMIt  is the nominal investment, and δ  is depreciation rate derived from EU KLEMS data.  
The perpetual inventory method is sensitive to initial capital stock. Especially when the 
tangible asset data prior to starting year of analysis is not available, initial capital stock ignore 
previously installed capital input, thus it may cause the underestimation of initial capital stock. 
To adjust initial capital stock, we calculated K KNB∑ ∑  for KOSPI listed firms by year 
and industry, then multiplied them to initial capital stock.  
 
Intermediate inputs  
Intermediate input is calculated as follows: 
 
Intermediate input = Sales cost +Selling & general administrative expenses –Wage – 
Depreciation – R&D expenses                (A.3) 
                                                  
6 For variable selection and detailed calculation, we referred Kim(2007) and Fukao et al.(2006).  
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Intermediate inputs are deflated by intermediate input deflators derived from EU KLEMS data.   
 
Labor input  
Man-hours are used as labor input. Industry average man-hours are derived from EU KLEMS 
data then man-hours are calculated by multiplying the number of employees and industry 
average man-hours.  
 
Capital Cost 
Capital cost is measured as follows:  
 
1 (1 )(1 )
1k
z pc p r u i
u p
λ λ δ⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞−= + − − + −⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟− ⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
                   (A.4) 
     
                    
 
where u is the effective corporate tax rate, λ is the own-capital ratio, r  is the long-term 
bond rate, i  is the prime rate, δ  is depreciation rate, p  is the price index, p  is the five 
year moving average of price index, and z  is the expected present value of tax savings due to 
depreciation allowances on a won of investment in capital goods. z  is calculated as follows:  
 
{ }( ) / (1 )(1 )z u r u iδ λ λ δ= + − − +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦i                       (A.5) 
 
Capital cost is calculated by multiplying c by the capital stock.  
 
Effective tax rate 
In Korea, taxes imposed on firms consist of corporate and local tax. Corporate tax is 
determined as the multiplication of profit and tax rate. Local tax consists of the one proportional 
to the amount of corporate tax and the other imposed uniformly in the same profit range. 
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However, the latter is negligible compare with the former. Considering aforementioned tax 
system, the effective tax rate can be determined as follows: 
 
(1 )N Lt t tτ τ τ= +                                        (A.6) 
 
where Ntτ  and  Ltτ  are tax rate of corporate tax and local tax in time t, respectively. 
 
Long-term bond rate 
The government bond more than five year has issued since mid 1990s, thus it is not 
appropriate as long-term bond rate. However, Korean government has issued several bonds in 
the relation with constructing house and road and so on. Among these, Housing bond has been 
one of the largest bond and has been traded for long time with stability. Therefore interest rate 
of 5 year Housing bond is used as a long-term bond rate.  
 
Prime rate 
Although the prime rate has been used since 1988, the movement of prime rate was so 
inflexible that usual interest rate was less than prime rate since 1999. Ultimately the prime rate 
is not used any longer in 2000s. As an alternative, Industrial Financial Debentures issued by the 
Korea Development Bank is used. It has been issued since 1954, and used as a standard for a 
long-term fixed debt.  
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Table 1. The coverage of data used, as of 2005  
 no of firms employees 
sales 
(bil. Won) 
tangible asset
(bil. Won) 
The whole firms with 50 or more 
employees and with 300 million 
Won of capital stocks  (A) 
6,144 1,539,465 712,316 259,873 
Data used 
in this research (B) 
5,141 1,131,349 537,519 196,900 
(B)/(A) 0.84 0.73 0.75 0.76 
(A) is referred from the Business Survey by National Statistical Office. 
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Table 2. Firm distribution by industry and year 
Industry 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total 
Food and kindred products 96 100 109 113 121 125 145 149 152 146 147 175 175 195 186 183 176 206 208 231 216 3,354 
Textile mill products 46 52 60 67 80 84 101 105 104 94 99 106 120 132 115 117 123 142 152 140 129 2,168 
Apparel 24 28 30 35 44 46 57 63 65 64 71 77 80 87 75 60 63 70 88 93 85 1,305 
Lumber and wood 4 4 5 6 6 5 8 9 8 8 8 11 14 21 30 28 27 28 29 34 32 325 
Furniture and fixtures 7 7 7 7 9 10 11 13 13 13 15 20 27 26 28 35 37 42 44 46 46 463 
Paper and allied 36 42 47 50 54 58 67 70 68 74 83 86 85 88 83 91 91 109 122 115 97 1,616 
Printing, publishing and allied 25 25 31 35 40 50 66 71 68 77 84 103 107 130 123 110 146 205 214 219 202 2,131 
Chemicals 152 167 181 201 229 237 275 292 288 285 310 332 341 365 334 319 355 420 421 435 391 6,330 
Petroleum and coal products 10 10 13 11 12 13 15 15 13 14 14 16 17 20 27 23 23 27 28 28 24 373 
Leather 10 10 14 16 19 20 24 24 24 23 23 25 24 27 26 25 21 21 28 32 26 462 
Stone, clay, glass 61 72 78 85 89 96 114 123 118 117 121 148 152 174 151 157 172 189 213 227 208 2,865 
Primary metal 68 75 78 90 109 123 154 159 154 167 188 210 244 272 287 284 316 395 387 408 374 4,542 
Fabricated metal 41 49 55 74 87 85 100 111 99 106 116 160 186 221 233 258 295 340 350 360 348 3,674 
Machinery, non-elec 40 47 72 82 96 105 139 150 139 156 188 336 407 502 511 534 624 714 758 810 734 7,144 
Electrical machinery 105 121 150 158 182 196 236 251 252 280 313 404 489 570 623 679 834 1,003 1,074 1,125 1,024 10,069 
Motor vehicles 51 73 91 104 127 133 171 176 177 199 228 245 291 323 401 434 468 559 581 589 559 5,980 
Transportation equipment & ordnance 9 7 10 11 13 13 15 20 22 22 28 47 69 78 83 90 91 111 115 120 117 1,091 
Instruments 16 17 21 25 26 29 38 38 38 40 48 77 88 111 131 122 143 167 181 190 179 1,725 
Rubber and misc plastics 22 29 37 46 55 54 74 78 73 76 89 116 149 186 187 197 217 268 299 312 273 2,837 
Misc. manufacturing 9 10 13 13 17 16 19 21 19 18 17 27 31 42 40 39 36 41 42 43 35 548 
Total 832 945 1,102 1,229 1,415 1,498 1,829 1,938 1,894 1,979 2,190 2,721 3,096 3,570 3,674 3,785 4,258 5,057 5,334 5,557 5,099 59,002 
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Table 3. The result of lnTFP measurement 
 
year no of obs 
weighted 
mean 
unweighted 
mean 
min max std dev 
1985 821  -0.016 -0.040  -0.569  0.489  0.119  
1986 929  -0.016 -0.027  -0.649  0.414  0.116  
1987 1,079  -0.002 -0.006  -0.704  0.398  0.119  
1988 1,216  -0.007 -0.001  -0.551  0.630  0.122  
1989 1,386  0.014  0.005  -1.076  0.545  0.142  
1990 1,470  0.022  0.024  -0.924  0.857  0.153  
1991 1,804  0.029  0.026  -1.393  0.810  0.183  
1992 1,902  0.019  0.016  -1.069  0.580  0.174  
1993 1,860  0.023  0.012  -1.381  0.600  0.171  
1994 1,939  0.053  0.021  -0.667  0.623  0.160  
1995 2,158  0.076  0.031  -0.781  1.013  0.166  
1996 2,677  0.077  0.051  -0.720  0.727  0.168  
1997 3,055  0.087  0.060  -0.929  0.971  0.181  
1998 3,519  -0.014 0.001  -1.019  0.803  0.214  
1999 3,625  0.091  0.073  -1.199  1.103  0.181  
2000 3,745  0.173  0.103  -0.929  0.880  0.171  
2001 4,222  0.167  0.118  -0.719  0.934  0.173  
2002 5,011  0.223  0.127  -0.918  0.924  0.187  
2003 5,274  0.247  0.140  -0.780  0.868  0.193  
2004 5,137  0.274  0.144  -0.794  1.046  0.197  
2005 4,728  0.279  0.164  -0.697  1.098  0.197  
` 
 
Table 4. The result of Olley and Pakes decomposition  
Industry year aggregate productivity 
unweighted 
mean covariance Industry year 
aggregate 
productivity 
unweighted 
mean covariance
1985 -0.026  -0.040  0.014 1985 -0.030  -0.035  0.005  
1990 -0.026  -0.037  0.011 
Textile mil 
products 1990 0.016  -0.001  0.017  
Food and 
kindred 
products 1995 -0.014  -0.070  0.056  1995 -0.054  -0.093  0.039  
 2000 0.011  -0.050  0.062  2000 -0.062  -0.039  -0.023 
 2005 0.052  -0.038  0.091  2005 -0.025  -0.042  0.016  
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Apparel 1985 -0.008  -0.027  0.019 1985 0.001  0.019301 -0.018 
 1990 0.109  0.081  0.028 
Lumber and 
wood 1990 0.000  0.017894 -0.018 
 1995 0.097  0.023  0.074  1995 -0.121  -0.09541 -0.026 
 2000 0.119  0.071  0.048  2000 -0.082  -0.03731 -0.045 
 2005 0.154  0.139  0.015  2005 -0.015  0.007072 -0.022 
1985 0.057  -0.015  0.072 1985 0.024  -0.023  0.047  Furniture and 
fixtures 1990 0.237  0.272  -0.035 
Paper and 
allied 1990 0.050  0.037  0.013  
 1995 0.187  0.152  0.035  1995 0.078  0.046  0.033  
 2000 0.153  0.104  0.049  2000 0.048  0.010  0.038  
 2005 0.180  0.146  0.034  2005 0.032  -0.018  0.051  
1985 0.056  -0.037  0.093 Chemicals 1985 -0.024  -0.054  0.030  
1990 0.150  0.006  0.144  1990 -0.013  0.021  -0.034 
Printing and 
publishing and 
allied 1995 0.146  0.055  0.090  1995 -0.045  -0.031  -0.014 
 2000 0.199  0.125  0.074  2000 0.086  0.083  0.004  
 2005 0.063  0.026  0.037  2005 0.144  0.099  0.044  
1985 -0.017  -0.031  0.014 Leather 1985 -0.029  -0.016  -0.014 Petroleum and 
coal products 1990 -0.010  0.009  -0.019  1990 0.030  0.032  -0.002 
 1995 -0.009  -0.028  0.019  1995 0.055  0.006  0.049  
 2000 -0.042  -0.069  0.027  2000 0.009  0.004  0.004  
 2005 0.035  -0.041  0.075  2005 0.033  0.046  -0.013 
1985 -0.035  -0.061  0.026 1985 -0.019  -0.037  0.017  Stone, clay, 
glass 1990 -0.017  -0.005  -0.012 
Primary 
 metal 1990 -0.162  -0.024  -0.137 
 1995 0.009  0.028  -0.019  1995 -0.066  0.005  -0.071 
 2000 0.062  0.028  0.034  2000 0.013  0.036  -0.022 
 2005 0.090  0.072  0.017  2005 0.144  0.038  0.106  
1985 -0.124  -0.043  -0.080 1985 -0.035  -0.027  -0.008 Fabricated 
metal 1990 0.034  0.017  0.017 
Machinery, 
non-elec 1990 0.153  0.115  0.038  
 1995 -0.001  -0.065  0.064  1995 0.218  0.164  0.054  
 2000 -0.047  -0.087  0.040  2000 0.204  0.175  0.029  
 2005 -0.033  -0.085  0.052  2005 0.296  0.266  0.030  
1985 -0.007  -0.042  0.035 1985 0.002  -0.028  0.030  Electrical 
machinery 1990 0.063  0.018  0.045 
Motor 
vehicles 1990 0.088  0.025  0.064  
 1995 0.254  0.064  0.190  1995 0.182  0.094  0.088  
 2000 0.380  0.224  0.155  2000 0.218  0.142  0.075  
 2005 0.441  0.350  0.090  2005 0.233  0.201  0.032  
1985 0.043  -0.035  0.079 Instruments 1985 -0.021  -0.052  0.031  
1990 0.214  0.171  0.042  1990 0.158  0.161  -0.003 
Transportation 
equipment & 
ordinance 1995 0.214  0.176  0.038  1995 0.268  0.259  0.009  
 2000 0.264  0.180  0.084  2000 0.394  0.293  0.101  
 2005 0.290  0.273  0.017  2005 0.407  0.339  0.067  
1985 0.007  -0.017  0.024 1985 0.044  -0.034  0.078  Rubber and 
misc plastics 1990 0.058  -0.021  0.078 
Misc. 
manufacturing 1990 0.183  0.144  0.039  
 1995 0.010  -0.032  0.042  1995 0.133  0.133  0.000  
 2000 -0.001  -0.018  0.018  2000 0.209  0.183  0.027  
 2005 0.050  0.003  0.047  2005 0.138  0.154  -0.015 
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Table 5. The result of Griliches and Regev decomposition  
1993-1996 1999-2002 2002-2005 
 Industry 
within between Total within  between Total within between Total 
Food and kindred products 0.019 0.010 0.029 -0.008  0.008 0.000 0.021 0.001 0.022 
Textile mill products -0.003 0.004 0.001 0.046  0.018 0.064 -0.012 0.028 0.016 
Apparel -0.022 0.016 -0.006 0.054  -0.020 0.034 0.033 0.011 0.044 
Lumber and wood -0.004 -0.011 -0.015 0.080  0.001 0.081 -0.008 0.011 0.003 
Furniture and fixtures 0.008 0.004 0.012 0.013  0.017 0.031 0.008 -0.005 0.004 
Paper and allied -0.030 -0.004 -0.034 0.060  0.000 0.060 0.001 -0.001 0.000 
Printing, publishing and allied 0.012 0.017 0.030 -0.059  0.006 -0.053 0.048 0.025 0.073 
Chemicals 0.036 0.001 0.038 0.017  0.013 0.030 0.008 0.009 0.017 
Petroleum and coal products 0.024 -0.009 0.015 0.001  0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 
Leather 0.001 0.009 0.011 0.004  0.019 0.023 0.033 0.014 0.047 
Stone, clay, glass -0.004 0.005 0.001 0.047  0.007 0.053 -0.004 0.006 0.003 
Primary metal 0.028 0.009 0.037 0.042  0.005 0.047 0.010 0.008 0.017 
Fabricated metal -0.021 0.014 -0.007 0.008  0.001 0.009 0.003 -0.004 -0.001 
Machinery, non-elec 0.008 0.007 0.015 0.017  0.019 0.036 0.011 0.019 0.030 
Electrical machinery -0.037 0.006 -0.031 0.107  0.036 0.143 -0.014 0.009 -0.005 
Motor vehicles 0.030 -0.005 0.025 0.058  0.010 0.067 -0.018 -0.003 -0.020 
Transportation equipment & ordnance -0.007 -0.002 -0.009 0.031  -0.003 0.028 0.024 -0.003 0.021 
Instruments 0.028 0.015 0.043 0.005  0.009 0.014 0.010 0.018 0.027 
Rubber and misc plastics -0.015 0.007 -0.009 0.008  0.004 0.012 0.015 0.005 0.020 
Misc. manufacturing -0.018 0.014 -0.005 -0.016  0.010 -0.006 -0.010 0.031 0.022 
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics 
 
 level  mean median min max std. dev. 
TFP growth rate firm 0.016 0.013 -1.380 1.527  0.124  
lnTFP firm 0.079 0.076 -1.393 1.103  0.189  
log(total asset) firm 16.519 16.298 9.832 24.646  1.435  
age firm 13.991 11.000 0.000 109.000  11.343 
group dummy firm 0.571 1.000 0.000 1.000  0.495  
debt ratio firm 0.669 0.691 0.000 15.412  0.263  
no R&D dummy firm 0.435 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.496  
R&D intensity firm 0.008 0.000 -0.035 1.056  0.024  
export/output industry 0.450 0.389 0.011 2.918  0.448  
crisis firm 0.555 1.000 0.000 1.000  0.497  
competition industry 0.997 0.989 0.937 1.255  0.036  
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Table 7. The determinants of the TFP growth 
Pooled OLS Fixed effect model 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
constant -0.0375 * -0.0071  0.2006 *** 0.2416 *** 
 (-1.70)  (-0.29)  (7.05)  (7.94)       
lnTFP(t-1) -0.4023 *** -0.4026 *** -0.6174 *** -0.618 *** 
 (-117.48)  (-117.53)  (-143.21)  (-143.29)       
log(total asset)(t-1) -0.0015 *** -0.0015 *** -0.0115 *** -0.0115 *** 
 (-3.14)  (-3.15)  (-9.26)  (-9.25)       
age(t-1) -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0097 *** -0.0099 *** 
 (-6.08)  (-6.06)  (-4.33)  (-4.39)       
group dummy(t-1) 0.0054 *** 0.0054 ***          
 (4.75)  (4.74)           
debt ratio(t-1) -0.0009  -0.0009  0.0206 *** 0.0204 *** 
 (-0.39)  (-0.42)  (6.43)  (6.36)       
no R&D dummy(t-1) -0.001  -0.0011  -0.001  -0.0011       
 (-0.90)  (-0.91)  (-0.65)  (-0.68)       
R&D intensity(t-1) 0.1939 *** 0.1931 *** 0.0781 ** 0.0764 **  
 (7.68)  (7.65)  (2.02)  (1.97)       
export/output(t-1) 0.0089 ** 0.0095 ** 0.0078 * 0.0079 *   
 (2.35)  (2.50)  (1.91)  (1.93)       
post-crisis dummy (A) 0.0415 *** -0.0752 * 0.2769 *** 0.1258 **  
 (10.83)  (-1.84)  (6.80)  (2.21)       
competition(t-1) (B) 0.0367 * 0.006  0.0055  -0.0354       
 (1.77)  (0.26)  (0.27)  (-1.55)       
(A)*(B)   0.1186 ***   0.157 *** 
   (2.87)    (3.82)       
Year dummy Included  Included  Included  Included  
Industry dummy Included  Included      
Adj. R-squared 0.280    0.28   0.291   0.291       
no of obs 45,929   45,929   45,929   45,929       
The values in the parenthesis are t-values. *** , ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent 
levels, respectively. Dependent variable is the growth rate of TFP (=lnTFP(t)-lnTFP(t-1)), and postfix 
(t-1) means the one-year lags. 
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Table 8. Determinants of TFP growth rate by technology intensity 
 
sample high tech. medium-high medium-low low tech. 
constant 0.4979 *** 0.0358  0.1517 *** 0.0164      
 (5.59)  (0.85)  (3.62)  (0.24)      
lnTFP(t-1) -0.4465 *** -0.4631 *** -0.4137 *** -0.3595 *** 
 (-50.66)  (-80.93)  (-61.93)  (-47.10)      
log(total asset)(t-1) -0.0035 ** 0.0008  -0.0012  -0.002 *   
 (-2.52)  (1.12)  (-1.39)  (-1.75)      
age(t-1) -0.0003 * -0.0006 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0002 **  
 (-1.91)  (-6.52)  (-4.62)  (-2.27)      
group dummy(t-1) -0.0022  0.0061 *** 0.0099 *** 0.0077 *** 
 (-0.66)  (3.59)  (4.95)  (2.95)      
debt ratio(t-1) -0.0029  -0.015 *** -0.0102 ** 0.0058      
 (-0.47)  (-3.92)  (-2.48)  (1.33)      
no R&D dummy(t-1) 0.0035  -0.0036 ** -0.0003  -0.0015      
 (0.94)  (-2.02)  (-0.17)  (-0.61)      
R&D intensity(t-1) 0.1248 *** 0.212 *** -0.0861  0.0339      
 (2.78)  (5.05)  (-0.84)  (0.48)      
export/output(t-1) -0.0031  -0.0197 *** -0.0251 * 0.0219      
 (-0.34)  (-3.59)  (-1.83)  (1.40)      
post-crisis dummy (A) -0.4798 *** -0.0699  -0.2493 * 0.3809 *** 
 (-2.81)  (-1.19)  (-1.91)  (3.21)      
competition(t-1) (B) -0.389 *** 0.0612  -0.1197 *** 0.0057      
 (-4.19)  (1.45)  (-3.11)  (0.09)      
(A)*(B) 0.6023 *** 0.1543 *** 0.2902 ** -0.367 *** 
 (3.42)  (2.66)  (2.28)  (-3.12)      
Year dummy Included  Included  Included  Included  
Industry dummy Included  Included  Included  Included  
Adj. R-squared 0.288   0.336   0.309   0.224      
no of obs 7,966   17,448   11,065   9,450      
The values in the parenthesis are t-values. *** , ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent 
levels, respectively. Dependent variable is the growth rate of TFP(=lnTFP(t)-lnTFP(t-1)) 
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Figure 1. The mean of lnTFP 
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Figure 2. The mean of lnTFP by technology intensity 
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Figure 3. Gross output weighted mean of lnTFP by major industry  
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Figure 4. Griliches and Regev decomposition by major industry 
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Figure 5. Output share by quartile of lnTFP : major industries 
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